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WHERE ARE THE GATEKEEPERS? CHALLENGING UTAH’S 
THRESHOLD STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS 
TESTIMONY 
 




It is well established that trial courts act as gatekeepers to shield the jury from 
unreliable expert witness testimony,1 but in Utah the gatekeepers have all but 
vanished. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, a proponent of expert testimony need 
only make a threshold showing of reliability to gain a stamp of approval and be 
admitted into Utah courts.2 This standard has steadily shriveled since its inception 
in 2007 and now requires little more than a nod of the gatekeeper’s head.3 With such 
a low bar to clear, trial courts must now admit virtually all expert testimony.4 This, 
in turn, has progressively increased the risk of admitting faulty and unreliable 
testimony.5 When the State of Utah originally adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence 
several years prior to 2007, it did so to “supply a fresh starting place for the law of 
evidence . . . .”6 A similar fresh starting place is needed again today.  
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information about both the 
federal and Utah Rules of Evidence regarding the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony. Part II discusses the issues that have developed in Utah law because of 
the State’s minimal threshold standard. In particular, it examines how the standard 
has significantly reduced the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and has increased the 
risk of potentially unreliable testimony being admitted into court. Finally, Part III 
explores potential changes that can be made to Utah Rule 702 to combat the 
problems accompanying the low admissibility standard. One obvious approach is to 
revert to the federal rule, which would come with many advantages. Yet there would 
remain the problem of how then to treat years of Utah precedent. This Note proposes 
a better, and encouragingly simple, solution: that Utah make a minor alteration to 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 that will allow the courts to get out from under flawed 
precedent and give them a blank slate for analyzing and interpreting the rule. The 
proposed change is to amend the rule by inserting words akin to “foundational 
reliability” in place of the “threshold showing” language in the current Utah rule. At 
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1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., Reliability and Fit of Expert Testimony, in 4 WEINSTEIN’S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.05, § 702.05 (2017). 
2 UTAH. R. EVID. 702.  
3 See infra Part II. 
4 See infra Part II.  
5 See infra Part II. 
6 UTAH. R. EVID. preliminary note.  
1124 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
least one other state uses such language and has produced sturdier caselaw to support 
its rule. This kind of change in Utah would decrease the risk of admitting unreliable 
testimony as well as reinstate the gatekeeper function without wholesale 
abandonment of prior Utah precedent. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Expert Witness Testimony in Federal Courts 
 
1.  The Frye Test 
 
For nearly seventy years, federal courts in the United States applied the “Frye 
test” to determine admissibility of expert witness testimony.7 In 1923, the D.C. 
Circuit ruled that for expert witness testimony to be admissible, the proponent must 
show that the underlying scientific method was “sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”8 The Frye test 
gained popularity quickly, and the other federal circuits adopted the test.9 Many 
States likewise followed suit.10 This “general acceptance” test was the dominant 
standard in American evidentiary rulings until its proper scope and application 
became the subject of much public debate.11 The test was criticized as being too 
broad and vague while being simultaneously too strict and too lenient.12 Moreover, 
opponents of the Frye test argued that it was no longer valid because Rule 70213 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which had been enacted by Congress in 1975, had 
effectively superseded it.14  
  
                                                             
7 Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific 
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453, § 2 (2001).  
8 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
9 Lustre, supra note 7.  
10 Id.  
11 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586 (1993). 
12 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:10 
(4th ed. 2017). 
13 See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence 
After Sixteen Years -- The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the 
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992) (discussing the continued validity of the Frye test 
following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1250 (1980); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New 
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 883 (1982).  
14 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (codified as amended at 
FED. R. EVID. 702). 
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2.  Daubert as the Federal Standard  
 
In 1993, the Supreme Court considered whether the Frye test was still a 
workable standard or whether it had in fact been superseded by Rule 702.15 In 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court decided that it had been 
superseded.16 At the time of Daubert, Rule 702 stated that “[i]f scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.”17 The Court determined that there was nothing in Rule 702 that 
established “general acceptance” as a strict prerequisite to admissibility.18 Indeed, it 
felt a general acceptance requirement for expert testimony was “at odds with the 
‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to opinion testimony.’”19 The Court then listed a “flexible” set of 
factors that courts should consider for determining admissibility in conjunction with 
Rule 702.20 These factors include whether the scientific theory or technique (1) can 
be tested and falsified; (2) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) has 
a known or potential rate of error that is governed by standards; and (4) has general 
acceptance within the relevant scientific community.21 “The crux of Daubert is that 
courts are to act as gatekeepers . . . and are to look directly at the proffered evidence 
and assess its validity and reliability.”22 
The Supreme Court addressed issues relating to Rule 702 two more times in the 
six years following Daubert. The first was in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, where 
the Court held that a traditional abuse of discretion standard was appropriate for 
reviewing Rule 702 evidentiary rulings and that appellate courts “may not 
categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings 
disallowing it.”23 In 1999, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,24 the Court 
clarified that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, including nonscientific 
disciplines. Kumho also stands for the proposition that trial judges possess wide 
latitude in determining admissibility of evidence, and, rather than being limited to 
the factors in Daubert, they should assess reliability according to the “particular 
                                                             
15 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.  
16 Id. at 587. 
17 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (codified as amended at 
FED. R. EVID. 702). 
18 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.  
19 Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
20 Id. at 594–95. 
21 Id. at 593–95.  
22 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 7:10.  
23 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). 
24 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
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circumstances of the particular case at issue.”25 Thus, along with the refinements of 
the rule laid out by General Electric and Kumho, Daubert remains the standard in 
federal evidence cases.26 
 
3.  Amendments to Federal Rule 702 
 
In response to Daubert, the Court approved an amendment to Rule 702 in the 
year 2000.27 The Advisory Committee Notes (ACN) state that the “amendment 
affirms the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and provides general standards that the 
trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert 
testimony.”28 The general standards set forth in the amended Rule 702 are still listed 
in its current version:  
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.29 
 
Daubert, as interpreted under the amended Rule 702, has since solidified its 
place in American jurisprudence as the standard in federal evidentiary rulings.30 
However, as Daubert based its ruling upon a federal statute and not the Constitution, 
                                                             
25 Id. at 150. 
26 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 7:10. 
27 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment.  
28 Id.  
29 FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule as quoted is how it reads as of October 2017. The text of 
the rule after the 2000 Amendment was in a slightly different order than how the rule is 
written presently. The rule was amended in 2011 “as part of the restyling of the Evidence 
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent 
throughout the rules. These changes [were] intended to be stylistic only. There [was] no 
intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” There was no change in 
the underlying text between the 2000 version of the rule and the 2011 version which is why 
the current version is quoted here. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2011 
amendments. 
30 See PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.08 (Matthew Bender ed.) 
(5th ed. 2017); 1 CYRIL H. WECHT, FORENSIC SCIENCES § 19.05 (Matthew Bender ed.) 
(2018).  
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it was and still is, not binding on the States.31 The States are, therefore, free to adopt 
the Daubert standard, continue to follow the Frye test, or follow some combination 
of the two.32  
 
B.  Expert Witness Testimony Under the Utah Rules 
 
1.  Utah’s Adoption of the Federal Rules 
 
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court approved the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the Utah Supreme Court requested that the Utah State Bar Commission 
create a special committee to analyze whether the State of Utah should adopt the 
new Federal Rules of Evidence.33 Under the Constitution of Utah,34 and the Utah 
Supreme Court’s statutory rulemaking power,35 the committee later recommended 
adoption of the federal rules.36 Following that recommendation, the State of Utah 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1983 to “supply a fresh starting place for 
the law of evidence” but not to “present an ultimate end.”37 The State copied the 
federal rules verbatim, including Rule 702.38 
 
2.  Utah’s Version of the Frye Test  
 
One of the first cases at the Utah Supreme Court that tested the newly adopted 
Rule 702, and which became the standard for some time, was State v. Rimmasch.39 
There, the Court decided what standard to apply to evidentiary rulings on the 
admissibility of expert witness testimony,40 particularly in light of the recent 
adoption of the federal rule and the State’s prior case law on the issue.41 The Court 
decided to “follow[] the modern trend and abandon[] exclusive reliance on Frye.”42 
                                                             
31 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 30, § 1.11.  
32 Id.  
33 UTAH R. EVID. preliminary note. 
34 UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 1.  
35 UTAH CODE § 78A-3-103 (2018). 
36 UTAH R. EVID. preliminary note. 
37 Id.  
38 State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989) superseded by rule, UTAH R. 
EVID. 702, as recognized in, State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012). 
39 Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396.   
40 Id.  
41 See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 640–42 (Utah 1996) (reviewing the court’s 
rule 702 jurisprudence); Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1362 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., 
concurring) (noting that for judicial notice of “inherent reliability” the proffered expert 
testimony must meet a very high level of reliability); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 
1234 (Utah 1980) (holding that “the admissibility of scientific evidence, while taking into 
account general scientific acceptance and widespread practical application, must focus in all 
events on proof of inherent reliability” (emphasis added)).  
42 Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396.  
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The Court followed the standard which was set out in Phillips v. Jackson, where 
“‘inherent reliability’ . . . became the touchstone of admissibility.”43 This inherent 
reliability analysis examined the “correctness of the principles underlying the 
scientific testimony, the accuracy and reliability of the methods utilized in 
application of the principles to the subject matter before the court, and the 
qualifications of the experts who gathered and analyzed the data.”44 The Court 
continued by explaining that “the purpose of a more restrictive test for judging the 
admissibility of scientific testimony is to assure, as a threshold matter, that the 
evidence is sufficiently reliable to go to the finder of fact.”45 The Rimmasch standard 
was a valuable principle of law, but it was later found to have been superseded by a 
puzzling amendment to Rule 702, which began the erosion of the gatekeeper 
function.  
 
3.  Utah’s Departure from Daubert and Introduction of the Threshold Standard 
 
The rule set forth in Rimmasch was the standard for admissibility of expert 
witness testimony in Utah for many years.46 However, in 2007, Utah amended Rule 
702, bolstering the idea of a “threshold showing” of reliability.47 Courts have 
subsequently viewed Rimmasch as being superseded by the amended Rule 702,48 
which departed from its federal counterpart in several respects, the most prominent 
being the addition of the words “threshold showing.” Utah Rule 702 now reads: 
 
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
                                                             
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 410 (Durham, J., concurring).  
45 Id. at 396 (emphasis added) (citing Philips, 615 P.2d at 1233).  
46 See, e.g., State v. Rothlisberger, 147 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Utah 2006) (noting the court 
has “required a certain level of reliability for novel expert evidence”); State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) (“[T]he question that must be posed prior to the admission of any 
expert evidence is whether, ‘on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact’” 
(quoting Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8)); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 940 (Utah App. 1990) 
(noting expert testimony offered in the instant case was the type rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Rimmasch). 
47 UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). 
48 See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892, 930 n. 134 (Utah 2012) (“In amending rule 
702, we intended ‘to clarify the requirements for admission’ of expert testimony and 
subsume the Rimmasch standard into rule 702.” (quoting Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis 
Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah 2010))); State v. Guard, 316 P.3d 444, 453 
(Utah App. 2013) (noting the updated rule 702 “‘subsume[s]’ the Rimmasch test” (citing 
State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1114 (Utah 2009), (alteration in original) (rev’d 371 P.3d 1 
(Utah 2015)).  
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(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as 
the basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the 
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony 
(1) are reliable, 
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the 
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data 
and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally 
accepted by the relevant expert community.49 
 
The ACN to the 2007 amendment states that, “[a]lthough Utah law 
foreshadowed in many respects the developments in federal law that commenced 
with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the 
Utah and federal approaches to expert testimony.”50 The ACN further stated that 
trial judges should apply Rule 702 with “rational skepticism,” but the “degree of 
scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized 
principles or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria 
fashioned to test reliability.”51  
Based on the amended rule and the ACN, the Utah rule has been cobbled 
together to retain bits and pieces of several tests. Section (a) of the amended rule, 
apart from the introductory language, still tracks the federal rule and is a remnant of 
the original federal rule from 1975.52 As indicated by the ACN, the amended Utah 
rule is designed to apply to all evidentiary rulings consistent with the decision in 
Kumho Tire.53 Yet, interestingly, section (c) of the amended Utah rule “retains 
limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony.”54 And, as is most 
relevant to this Note, the Utah rule inserted the words “threshold showing” into 
section (b) of the amended rule.55 The ACN clarifies that, “[u]nlike the federal 
rule . . . , the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make 
only a ‘threshold’ showing.”56 These words have become particularly troublesome 
in Utah case law and have produced confusing and inconsistent results. 
 
                                                             
49 UTAH R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). The Utah rule was also amended in 2011 “as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules.” UTAH R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes. 
The amendments were “stylistic only.” Id. The major changes between Federal Rule 702 and 
the Utah rule occurred during the 2007 amendments to the Utah rules. Id. 
50 UTAH R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes.  
51 Id.; see also Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762 
(Utah 2010). 
52 UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). 
53 UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes. 
54 Id.; see also State v. Quintana, 103 P.3d 168 (Utah 2004). 
55 UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). 
56 Id. (emphasis added).  
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II.  ISSUES CREATED BY UTAH’S MINIMAL THRESHOLD STANDARD 
 
The 2007 amendment to Utah Rule 702, and in particular the addition of the 
threshold standard, has not only become a procedural conundrum for trial court 
gatekeepers, it has reduced evidentiary rulings to little more than a game of chance. 
Presumably, the amended rule emphasized a “threshold showing” as a holdover from 
Rimmasch where the Court said that district courts should determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony “as a threshold matter.”57 Deciding something “as 
a threshold matter” commonly means making a decision firstly, preliminarily, or as 
a prerequisite to an action or event at a future date. This is not the case in Utah, 
however. The idea of a “threshold showing,” at least under Utah’s evidence law, has 
abandoned this common meaning. It now encapsulates the actual level of reliability 
of evidence rather than deciding whether the evidence is reliable before allowing it 
to go to the jury. As illustrated below, this level of reliability—which is now 
described as a threshold level—is closer to a de minimis standard teetering on the 
edge of being no real standard at all. 
 
A.  The Diminishing Role of Utah’s Gatekeepers 
 
Since the amendment, state trial courts are left with a vague and ill-defined 
standard for determining when proffered expert witness testimony has crossed the 
elusive line of admissibility. Based on language from post-amendment cases58 that 
have diminished the threshold showing of reliability, trial judges are now compelled 
to give the benefit of the doubt to the experts and admit evidence even when there 
is little more than the ipse dixit of the expert. This Note does not attempt to disregard 
the importance of defining the roles between the triers of fact and law, but as the line 
of post-amendment cases shows, the gatekeeper function of Utah’s judges has 
eroded almost to obsolescence. Below are analyses of three Utah cases that illustrate 
the diminishing role of the trial court gatekeepers. In all three, the trial courts, who 
were inevitably more intimate with the facts of each case, concluded that the expert 
witness opinions were unreliable only to be reversed because of Utah’s minimal 
threshold standard.  
  
                                                             
57 State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989). 
58 See infra Parts II.A.1–3.  
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1.  The Beginning of the End with Eskelson 
 
The first significant Utah case59 that applied the amended Rule 702 was 
Eskelson v. Davis Hospital60 in 2010. As noted previously, Rule 702(b) stipulates 
that for evidence to be admissible, it must meet three criteria in light of the threshold 
standard.61 The principles and methods underlying the testimony must be reliable, 
based upon sufficient facts or data, and reliably applied to the facts.62 In Eskelson, 
the father of a child who had suffered a perforated eardrum sought to introduce the 
expert testimony of a medical doctor to show that the treating physician had departed 
from the standard of care while trying to extract a foreign object from the child’s 
ear.63 The defense moved to strike the testimony claiming it failed to meet the 
threshold requirements of Rule 702.64 The district court granted the motion to strike 
and found that the testimony did not comply with Rule 702 because the expert 
physician’s “testimony was not based on any scientific, technical, or other scientific 
knowledge, that his testimony would not assist the trier of fact, and that his methods 
were not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.”65 Indeed, the 
physician could not even articulate any scientific methodology.66 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court—in an opinion that produced more 
questions than answers—reversed, using a 702(b) analysis.67 First, the Court 
analyzed the district court’s decision under 702(b)(1).68 It determined that despite 
the district court’s finding that the physician had employed little science in 
producing his testimony, his prior experience as a doctor satisfied Utah’s minimal 
threshold standard.69 The only rationale the Court offered to support its decision was 
that the physician “had experience with the removal of foreign objects from the ears 
of children,” which alone “satisfie[d] the threshold showing that [the physician’s] 
                                                             
59 One year earlier, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103 
(Utah 2009), but the defendant in that case had been convicted prior to the 2007 amendment 
to rule 702. The court analyzed the case under the previous rule as well as the amended rule, 
but the holding in that case only related to eyewitness expert testimony. This Note does not 
address the holding in Clopten nor does it analyze evidentiary rulings of eyewitness 
testimony.  
60 Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762 (Utah 2010).  
61 UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). 
62 Id.  
63 Eskelson, 242 P.3d at 764.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 766. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 766–67. 
69 Id. 
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testimony was reliable.”70 In essence, the Court decided that, because the doctor had 
seen similar situations before, his testimony was good enough.71  
Next, the Supreme Court concluded that the expert’s opinion also satisfied the 
requirements of 702(b)(2).72 The district court had found that the expert did not base 
his testimony on sufficient facts and data because he had “selectively relied on only 
certain testimony” to form his opinion.73 It had found that the physician “chose to 
believe only facts in the record that supported his argument that [the other physician] 
caused the injury while disregarding testimony that [the child] was tearful and 
whiney before he arrived” at the hospital.74 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court again 
found this to be erroneous and stated that, “[a]lthough an expert cannot give opinion 
testimony that ‘flies in the face of uncontroverted physical facts also in evidence,’ 
an expert can rely on his own interpretation of facts that have a foundation in the 
evidence, even if those facts are in dispute.”75 The Court reasoned that, “once [the 
physician’s] testimony is admitted at trial, [the defense] will have the opportunity to 
explore the factual basis for [the physician’s] testimony and point out the dispute 
over the facts on which he relies.”76 While factual disputes admittedly can be pointed 
out at trial, Rule 702 requires that the testimony first be reliable before it even makes 
it to trial.77 The process of cherry-picking evidence and then forming an expert 
opinion from that evidence is hardly a method that is “based upon sufficient facts or 
data.”78 
Finally, the Court also ruled that the physician’s testimony was admissible 
under 702(b)(3).79 Eskelson’s physician testified that, because of his specialized 
knowledge, he knew a sudden instance of pain normally accompanies the perforation 
of an eardrum.80 The physician had analyzed the evidence and “identified [the 
treating physician’s] examination as the point in time when this sudden instance of 
pain occurred.”81 The Court stated in conclusory fashion that “[t]his testimony 
clearly applies [the physician’s] specialized knowledge to the facts in evidence in a 
way that satisfies the threshold showing of reliability required by rule 702.”82 Here 
again, the Supreme Court resorted to the experience of the expert only and deemed 
                                                             
70 Id.  
71 Id. (“Dr. Bateman’s testimony regarding his experience as a physician, in dealing 
with similar situations as Jacob’s, constitutes a threshold showing of reliability.”). 
72 Id. at 767. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 766. 
75 Id. at 767 (quoting Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 110 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
1941)). 
76 Id.  
77 UTAH R. EVID. 702. 
78 Id.  
79 Eskelson, 242 P.3d at 767–68. 
80 Id. at 768. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
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it reliable enough. This case aptly illustrates the beginning of the end of Utah’s 
gatekeepers. The trial court fulfilled its role as gatekeeper to screen out unreliable 
testimony. However, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the applicable standard 
for a threshold showing is lower than that applied by the trial court and reversed the 
exclusion of the expert testimony. Other than explaining that the standard for a 
threshold showing is low, the Court set binding precedent with little guidance about 
the right balance for gatekeepers to strike. 
 
2.  Gunn Hill Dairy Continues the Trend 
 
Two years later, the Utah Court of Appeals took its turn in revealing the low 
bar of the threshold standard when it decided Gunn Hill Dairy Properties v. L.A. 
Department of Water & Power.83 A group of dairy farmers sued the owners of an 
electrical power transmission company, alleging that high mortality rates and low 
milk production in their livestock resulted from stray current produced by the power 
company.84 Plaintiffs had hired an electrician to conduct electrical testing near their 
farms, and the electrician “detected high levels of stray DC [current].”85 Following 
this discovery, the electrician told a group of nearly one hundred local dairy farmers 
that “local dairy herd deaths and disease levels were ‘too high’ because of the stray 
electricity.”86 Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired counsel, electrical and power plant 
engineering experts, and other experts and sued the defendant power company.87 
The defendant promptly moved to exclude the opinions of the plaintiffs’ experts.88 
After a five-day evidentiary hearing, the district court issued an order to exclude the 
evidence concerning stray current.89 It articulated four reasons for excluding the 
testimony.90 First, the expert’s “statements regarding symptoms contradicted the 
Merck Veterinary Manual.”91 Second, the expert “failed to perform adequate 
differential diagnosis testing on each individual dairy farm.”92 Third, the expert’s 
epidemiological study was flawed.93 And fourth, the expert could not “establish 
causation based on an epidemiological study because such a study is used to 
                                                             
83 Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 269 P.3d 980 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2012). 
84 Id. at 983. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 983–84. 
88 Id. at 984. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 984–85. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
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establish association, not causation.”94 The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the 
district court misinterpreted amended Rule 702.95 
On review, the Court of Appeals set binding precedent that again significantly 
lowered the bar for admissibility. It concluded first that, despite the Merck 
Veterinary Manual’s stating that “controlled studies have not shown that stray 
current causes the aforementioned problems,”96 the district court—even after a five-
day evidentiary hearing—had simply “confused the concepts of diagnosis with 
effects of stray current.”97 Second, despite the trial court’s finding that the expert 
failed to perform thorough investigations, the Court of Appeals decided the evidence 
was admissible because “the fact that his testing was superficial at some farms does 
not make the evidence inadmissible,” but “it may lessen the value of his expert 
testimony.”98 Third, the Court of Appeals felt that, despite the flaws in the expert’s 
testimony and methodology, the evidence should nevertheless be admitted “because 
no epidemiological study is flawless.”99 
The bottom line is that the Court of Appeals was only following precedent. It 
relied on the fact that Utah’s threshold standard “requires only a basic foundational 
showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible.”100 Of course, 
the Court of Appeals should not bear full responsibility for issuing a standard that is 
merely a hiccup. It was merely following the ACN, and the “threshold showing” 
language had already been indelibly written in the books.  
The Court continued its reasoning by noting that “the line between assessing 
reliability and weighing evidence can be elusive” and that the court only plays a 
preliminary role because “the factfinder bears the ultimate responsibility for 
evaluating the accuracy, reliability, and weight of the testimony.”101 It further 
explained that when a court seeks to evaluate the weight of expert testimony rather 
than its threshold liability, it risks going beyond the scope of its gatekeeper 
responsibility and “into the factfinder’s territory.”102  
That said, this decision highlights precisely the problem with Utah’s Rule 702 
cases—that the rule conflates the preliminary role of assessing reliability with 
                                                             
94 Id. For several reasons the trial court also concluded the expert’s opinion regarding 
damages unreliable and therefore inadmissible. “The court permitted [the expert] to render 
certain other opinions.” Id.  
95 Id. at 985. 
96 Id. at 992. 
97 Id. at 992–93. 
98 Id. at 993. 
99 Id. at 994. 
100 Id. at 993 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes); see also State 
v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]hile the trial court acts as a 
gatekeeper to keep expert evidence that is not reliable from the fact finder, this threshold 
determination does not extend to exclude contradictory evidence.”).  
101 Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 269 P.3d 980, 995 
(Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
102 Id.  
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determining the actual level of reliability. Deciding evidence is reliable enough to 
pass a wisp of threshold is not the same as preliminarily deciding evidence actually 
is reliable. While it is proper that the court be limited to a preliminary role only, and 
for the factfinder to ultimately weigh the evidence, Utah’s gatekeepers should not 
be required to divine some elusive and ethereal line in their preliminary 
responsibility of “screen[ing] out unreliable expert testimony.”103 The gatekeeper’s 
job is to make sure that only reliable testimony is placed at the feet of the finder of 
fact.104 Again, the district court in this case had good reason to exclude the testimony 
and even conducted a five-day evidentiary hearing before doing so, but the Court of 
Appeals was bound to reverse because of Utah’s threshold standard precedent.  
 
3.  Finishing It Off with Majors 
 
In a more recent case,105 the Utah Court of Appeals again addressed whether 
expert testimony had met the threshold showing and again was compelled to reverse 
a trial court’s decision because of the low standard. In Majors v. Owens,106 the 
Majorses were involved in a car accident and allegedly suffered neck and back 
injuries because of it.107 To support their claim, they hired physician experts to 
testify that the injuries were caused by the accident.108 The defendants argued that 
the Majorses’ experts did no more than establish a chronological relationship 
between the time of the car accident and the Majorses’ alleged injuries.109 The 
defendants then moved to exclude the testimonies of the Majorses’ expert witnesses 
because their opinions were not based on any reliable facts or methodology.110 
                                                             
103 Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766. (Utah 
2010); see also Sheehan, 273 P.3d at 435 (“[T]he trial court acts as a gatekeeper to keep 
expert evidence that is not reliable from the fact finder”).  
104 See Sheehan, 273 P.3d at 435. 
105 See Majors v. Owens, 365 P.3d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 2015), cert. granted, 384 P.3d 
1139 (Utah 2016). The Utah Court of Appeals has decided more recent evidence cases citing 
the amended Rule 702, but none more recent than Majors in determining if the threshold 
showing has been met. See State v. Yalowski, 404 P.3d 53, 59–61 (Utah Ct. App. 2017); 
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 397 P.3d 772, 775–77 (Utah Ct. App. 2017). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed Rule 702 in recent cases. See State v. 
Griffin, 384 P.3d 186, 202–03 (Utah 2016) (holding that DNA evidence met the threshold 
standard); State v. Guard, 371 P.3d 1, 19 (Utah 2015) (holding that, under Clopton, 
eyewitness expert testimony requires a showing of reliability); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 
1103, 1104–11 (Utah 2009).  
106 Majors v. Owens, 365 P.3d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 2015), cert. granted, 384 P.3d 1139 
(Utah 2016). 
107 Id. at 166.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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The district court agreed and granted the motion.111 It found that the treating 
physicians’ opinions were unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702.112 It 
maintained that “an expert must do more than merely establish a chronological 
relationship between an accident and the patient’s symptoms” and that the physician 
expert “reach[ed] assumptions based on chronology without any underlying analysis 
of the [Majorses’] prior medical problems.” 113 They performed no independent 
analysis nor reviewed the Majorses’ “significant medical histories as contributing or 
aggravating factors to their medical conditions.”114 The medical doctors even 
seemed “to acknowledge their complete failure to independently analyze other 
potential causes.”115 Based on this reasoning, the district court felt that “the jury 
would engage in speculation rather than fact finding”116 and excluded the testimony.  
Following the analysis set forth in Eskelson, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the decision to exclude and held that the experts’ testimony was admissible because 
it had met the threshold requirements of Rule 702.117 It said that, “[a]lthough the 
foundation for the [experts’] opinions appears somewhat thin, . . . the district court’s 
preliminary assessment of the [experts’] reliability displaced the role of the jury to 
evaluate the weight to be given to the evidence.”118 The Court further reasoned that 
while the expert opinions had weaknesses, the defense would “have the opportunity 
to expose and probe such weaknesses once the opinions [were] admitted at trial.”119 
So again, a Utah appellate court felt that it had little choice but to reverse a trial 
court’s decision to exclude expert witness testimony because Utah’s threshold 
showing standard is more like a barely reliable standard than simply a threshold 
matter. As these three cases show, Utah’s gatekeepers are not shielding the jury from 
much, if any, testimony. Utah’s “reliability standard” has now become more a 
standard of almost no reliability. 
 
B.  The Risk of Admitting Unreliable Testimony Is Increased 
 
Because Utah trial courts are required to find only a “basic foundational 
showing of indicia of reliability”120 before admitting expert witness testimony, the 
risk is becoming increasingly great that unreliable testimony will make its way to 
the jury. As the above cases demonstrate, if a trial court decides that certain expert 
opinions are unreliable, they do so at the risk of being reversed by appellate courts 
                                                             
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 167. 
113 Id. (alterations in original). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 167. 
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
118 Id. at 172. 
119 Id.  
120 Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 269 P.3d 980, 993 
(Utah Ct. App. 2012) (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes) (emphasis 
omitted).  
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on the grounds that the minimal threshold standard was indeed met. What is the point 
of having gatekeepers if they are bound by statute and precedent to find nothing 
more than a shadow of reliability before deeming the evidence “reliable enough” for 
the jury to hear? Not to say that every time a trial court decides to exclude testimony, 
it will automatically be reversed by an appellate court. If, for example, the proffered 
expert were a random passerby having zero credentials and an opinion based on 
absolutely no scientific methods, and the trial court excluded the testimony, an 
appellate court would surely agree. But that does not change the fact that Utah’s 
threshold standard has been getting weaker and weaker. As the standard continues 
to shrink, the risk of unreliable testimony reaching the jury increases. This brings 
with it its own set of issues, including juries engaging in excessive speculation, 
courts admitting “junk science,” and cases being decided incorrectly by juries that 
were influenced by persuasive—yet unreliable—expert opinions.121  
Although Daubert does not bind the States, the Supreme Court has clarified 
that an essential function of the gatekeeping responsibility is to “ensure that any and 
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”122 
The Utah Supreme Court echoed that idea when it said trial judges must, in their 
gatekeeper responsibility, “screen out unreliable expert testimony.”123 But how can 
trial courts meet their obligation to “screen out unreliable evidence” when binding 
precedent requires them to refrain from weighing the reliability of the evidence? 
Utah needs this Catch-22124 standard to be corrected to give judges the ability to 
make meaningful decisions to exclude or admit expert testimony. 
 
III.  POTENTIAL CHANGES TO RULE 702 
 
Utah Rule 702 needs amending. The line of cases applying the rule has done 
nothing more than establish that, in Utah, everything short of laughable makes it 
                                                             
121 See, e.g., Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 176–77 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“Daubert attempts to strike a balance between a liberal admissibility standard for relevant 
evidence on the one hand and the need to exclude misleading ‘junk science’ on the other.”); 
David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific 
Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 909–10 (2013) (explaining that 
Daubert was meant to “hold the line against junk science and . . . intended to tighten the rules 
of expert evidence”); N. J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact 
of Judges’ Admissibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 1, 13 (2009) (noting that a judge’s decision to admit “junk science” would 
“endow[] that evidence with additional weight . . . .”). 
122 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586, 589 (1993) 
(emphasis added).  
123 Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah 
2010).  
124 Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
catch-22 [https://perma.cc/HF5E-74WZ] (last visited July 28, 2018) (“circumstance or rule 
that denies a solution”). 
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through the gate. The jury is not shielded from unreliable expert testimony, and the 
gatekeepers are all but ineffective. Deciding how the rule should be amended, 
though, is a much more difficult and challenging task. The first potential solution, 
and maybe the easiest to implement, is to adopt the current version of the federal 
rule. Embracing the federal rule, however, comes with its own challenges and may 
not prove workable under existing Utah precedent. Another solution would be to 
model a rule after the rules of other States that do not follow the federal rule. These 
alternatives are each discussed below. 
 
A.  Adopting the Current Version of Federal Rule 702 
 
Adopting, verbatim, the current version of the federal rule comes with both 
advantages and disadvantages. The most significant difference between the federal 
rule and the Utah rule is the “threshold showing” requirement in subsection (b).125 
Another major difference is subsection (c) which exists only to explain the insertion 
of the minimal threshold standard.126 If Utah were to adopt the Federal Rule 702, the 
threshold showing requirement in subsection (b) and the entirety of subsection (c) 
would no longer exist. The remaining text of the Utah rule is essentially the same as 
the federal rule.127 The potential advantages of adopting the federal rule are at least 
twofold. First, Utah courts would enjoy greater efficiency in deciding cases because 
of the ability to tap into a large body of persuasive caselaw from which to draw 
analogous support. There are 108 federal courts in the U.S., comprised of ninety-
four district courts, thirteen circuit courts, and the United States Supreme Court.128 
As it now stands, federal cases applying Rule 702 are wholly inapplicable to Utah 
cases as the two jurisdictions rely on entirely different standards. Because there are 
more cases dealing with Federal Rule 702, both in terms of the number of courts and 
length of time courts have been deciding cases under the rule, Utah courts would be 
able to more quickly locate and compare cases that have the same or similar fact 
patterns. Not only would the process of deciding expert witness testimony cases 
become more efficient, there would be less doubt as to which kind of evidence is 
admissible and which is not. Although the federal cases would not be binding on the 
                                                             
125 UTAH R. EVID. 702(b).  
126 UTAH R. EVID. 702(c). 
127 The mere deletion of subsections (b) and (c) in the Utah rule would not produce text 
that is precisely identical to the federal rule. As a result of the 2007 amendment to the Utah 
rule, certain words and phrases taken from the federal rule ended up in different subsections 
and sequences of the Utah rule. For example, the phrase “principles and methods” occurs 
twice in the federal rule and is retained in subsection (b) of the Utah rule immediately 
following the “threshold showing.” Compare UTAH. R. EVID. 702 with FED. R. EVID. 702.  
128 Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Justice 101: Introduction to the Federal Court System, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts 
[https://perma.cc/35QL-ZJQN]. 
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Utah courts, adoption of the federal rule would place a much greater body of caselaw 
at their fingertips.  
Second, and more importantly, there would be a higher standard for 
admissibility, which would reduce the risk of admitting unreliable testimony. As 
pointed out above, Utah’s threshold standard for reliability is easily cleared, and 
potentially unreliable testimony is more likely to be admitted because of it. The 
federal rule does not include the words “threshold showing.”129 The federal standard 
is higher than the Utah standard: The federal rule simply states that a qualified expert 
may testify if “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact . . . ; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.”130 Based on Daubert131 and its progeny, trial judges must “ensure” that 
the “testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”132 The 
question in federal cases is not whether the expert testimony meets the “elusive”133 
and “somewhat thin”134 threshold standard, but whether it is, in fact, reliable.  
As with any change to an established law, there are disadvantages. The same is 
true of electing to adopt the current version of Federal Rule 702 in Utah. If Utah 
were to revert to the federal rule, the first question would be whether all the cases 
that applied the Utah rule as amended from 2007 to the present day are overruled or 
superseded by the rule change. That is over ten years of caselaw that may be 
invalidated or simply brushed under the rug. It is well-known that the “Court’s 
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on 
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”135 To throw out every Rule 702 
case from the last ten years would not be wise. Therefore, adopting the federal rule 
while maintaining adherence to Utah precedent would be a tricky task indeed.  
Another potential downside of adopting the federal rule is the possibility that 
too much expert testimony will be excluded from the jury. It is settled that “the 
factfinder bears the ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability, 
and weight of the testimony.”136 If Utah’s threshold standard has reached the point 
of letting too much in, the opposite could also become true if the threshold were 
raised: It could keep too much out. A reliability standard that is too high could tread 
“into the factfinder’s territory.”137 Finally, there is also the possibility that trial court 
judges could abuse their gatekeeper responsibilities and exclude expert testimony 
too often. This, of course, could be corrected through the appeals process, but that 
                                                             
129 FED. R. EVID. 702.  
130 Id.  
131 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
132 Id. at 589. 
133 Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 269 P.3d 980, 995 
(Utah Ct. App. 2012).  
134 Majors v. Owens, 365 P.3d 165, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). 
135 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962). 
136 Gunn Hill, 269 P.3d at 995. 
137 Id.  
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would still mean delaying final decisions and expending additional State and litigant 
funds to pursue interlocutory appeals. In sum, adoption of the federal rule may prove 
workable, but if Utah chooses this route, it needs to understand the problems that 
come with it, and it needs to be willing to live with those consequences.  
 
B.  Modeling Other States’ Rule 702 
 
Another option to consider for revamping Utah Rule 702 is to look at other 
States to see how they have treated their own rules of evidence post-Frye and 
Daubert. Twenty-five States have followed Daubert or adopted tests that are 
extremely similar,138 and their respective rules on expert testimony essentially mirror 
the original federal rule.139 Fifteen of the States have elected to continue to follow 
the traditional Frye test, and six States have not wholly or expressly rejected Frye 
but apply the Daubert factors.140 Utah is one of the four remaining States that has 
developed its own evidence test.141 Utah, however, is the only State in the nation that 
relies on a minimal “threshold” standard.142 Other States have developed rules that 
closely resemble the Utah rule, absent the threshold language.143 Utah could follow 
the example of those States, but doing so would have more or less the same impact 
as adopting the federal rule, which was discussed above.  
The pros and cons identified in Section III.A above also apply if Utah were to 
emulate the rules of other States: To follow those rules could result in the 
overturning of years of Utah precedent and risk excluding previously admissible 
evidence. That could, in turn, disrupt the practices of many trial attorneys and trial 
judges that have become accustomed to Utah’s minimal standard.  
Perhaps the best solution is to amend the rule in such a way that would raise 
the threshold standard and restore the gatekeeping function of judges but do so 
discarding the “threshold” language. A promising amendment may look to the 
Minnesota expert witness rule.  
Minnesota’s rule on expert witness testimony begins by tracking the original 
federal rule, much like Utah’s rule, but then adds the qualifier of “foundational 
reliability.”144 The rule reads: 
                                                             
138 See Lustre, supra note 7, §§3–53 (cataloguing whether each state applies Daubert 
or a similar test). 
139 See, e.g., COLO. R. EVID. 702; IDAHO R. EVID. RULE 702; CONN. CODE EVID. 7-2; 
TENN. R. EVID. 702, 2001 advisory comm’n cmt. (affirming that, “[t]he Frye test no longer 
exists in Tennessee. In McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (1997), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court listed five nonexclusive factors taken from the federal case of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)”).  
140 See Lustre, supra note 7, §§8–53. 
141 See id. Georgia, Virginia, and Wisconsin are the other states that have developed 
their own separate tests. Id. 
142 Id. at § 51.  
143 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; FLA. STAT. TITLE VII § 90.702; MICH. R. EVID. 702.  
144 MINN. R. EVID. 702.  
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The 
opinion must have foundational reliability. In addition, if the opinion or 
evidence involves novel scientific theory, the proponent must establish 
that the underlying scientific evidence is generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community.145 
 
It may not be apparent from reading “foundational reliability” on the face of 
the rule that this verbiage bears any significant difference from the “threshold 
showing” language in the Utah rule. It is therefore essential to see how the Minnesota 
courts have interpreted this language. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that 
“foundational reliability ‘requires the proponent of a . . . test [to] establish that the 
test itself is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed 
to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.’”146 In 2006, Minnesota amended its 
Rule 702 and added the last two sentences now contained in the rule.147 Like Utah’s 
Rule 702(c), which is a remnant of the old Frye test, Minnesota’s foundational 
reliability is also viewed through the Frye lens.148 The main difference between 
Minnesota’s standard and Utah’s standard is one that concerns the level of reliability 
of the evidence. Where “threshold reliability” and “foundational reliability” may be 
viewed as synonymous semantically, the state courts’ interpretations of their own 
respective rules expose the difference.  
As noted, the Utah cases demonstrate that Utah appellate courts will likely 
reverse a district court’s order excluding expert witness testimony because of the 
threshold standard is very low. Minnesota, on the other hand, has taken a more 
gatekeeper-friendly approach to their “foundational reliability” standard. In Doe v. 
Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis,149 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
a district court’s decision to exclude expert witness testimony because the testimony 
had not cleared the foundational reliability standard.150 In that case, the expert for 
the plaintiff “presented 328 peer-reviewed scientific research articles purporting to 
show that repressed and recovered memory exists and that the theory is scientifically 
                                                             
145 Id. (emphasis added).  
146 Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 165 (Minn. 
2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
147 Id.  
148 Id. (the Minnesota Supreme Court noting that, “if the Frye-Mack standard applies, 
‘the particular scientific evidence in each case must be shown to have foundational 
reliability . . . .’”). 
149 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012). 
150 Id. at 170. 
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reliable.”151 One of the experts testified that “repressed memories not only exist, but 
that, when recovered, those memories are accurate.”152  
In response, the defense presented an expert that opined that the “theory of 
repressed and recovered memory is ‘highly controversial’ and that ‘[s]ome have 
called it the most heated debate currently in psychiatry.’”153 The expert for the 
defense felt the theory could not be “generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
community because something cannot be both generally accepted and highly 
controversial and debated.”154 The expert continued, saying that—notwithstanding 
their large quantity—the 328 articles presented by the plaintiff’s experts were 
without merit because of methodological flaws.155 The defense then moved to 
exclude the opinions of the plaintiff’s experts.156 After a three-day hearing on the 
admissibility of the testimony, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s expert 
testimony had not reached the foundationally reliable standard, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed.157 Archdiocese is not an isolated case in Minnesota, and it is evident 
from other cases158 that Minnesota’s version of “foundational reliability” is a higher 
standard than is Utah’s. The expert opinion in Archdiocese would surely have been 
admitted had it been filed in Utah.  
Minnesota’s take, or a similar approach, on the standard of admissibility of 
expert witness testimony serves as a good model for Utah. If Utah amended Rule 
702 to be similar to Minnesota’s amended rule and interpreted the purpose of the 
rule to “ensure reliability” like the language in Archdiocese, 159 Utah would raise the 
admissibility standard and restore the gatekeeper function without compromising 
prior Utah precedent. This is because the “foundational reliability” language of the 
Minnesota rule is comparable to the language in the Utah rule and the consequences 
of adopting a Minnesota-like rule would be less disruptive of Utah precedent than 
simply adopting the federal rule. If Utah were to amend Rule 702 and give it slightly 
                                                             
151 Id. at 157. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 158 (quotations omitted) (alteration in original).  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 See, e.g., State v. Uldrych, No. A13-1792, 2015 WL 1013537 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 
9, 2015) (affirming a trial court’s decision to exclude expert witness testimony because it did 
not comply with procedural safeguards and controls); Zandi v. Wyeth, No. A08-1455, 2009 
WL 2151141 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 2009) (upholding a district court’s decision to exclude 
testimony because the proffered expert was unqualified and as a result, did not satisfy the 
foundational reliability test); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 811–14 (Minn. 2000) 
(affirming a trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony because the scientific methods 
employed by the expert lacked foundational reliability and general acceptance). But see State 
v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 294 (Minn. 2011) (reversing a district court’s decision to exclude 
expert witness testimony on other grounds and not ruling on whether the expert testimony 
had foundational reliability). 
159 Doe, 817 N.W. 2d at 164.  
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more teeth, requiring judges to ensure reliability prior to admitting expert testimony, 




In conclusion, Utah’s Rule 702 on the admissibility of expert witness testimony 
is far too low. Utah trial courts cannot to fulfill their role as gatekeepers because the 
threshold standard forces them to admit almost everything without ensuring 
reliability. Accordingly, Utah evidence law will benefit from amending Rule 702 
whether it reverts to the federal rule or elects the Minnesota approach. Either is 
preferred to the almost nonexistent standard currently in place, which has drifted far 
from the “inherent[ly] reliab[le]” tradition and is no longer “the touchstone of 
admissibility”160 in Utah. The State should amend Rule of Evidence 702 to allow 
judges to make meaningful decisions on the admissibility of expert testimony once 
again. 
                                                             
160 State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989). 
